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Chiefs of Staff, as to the line he was to take in any conversations with his foreign colleagues.
(e.) That as regards Peking and Tientsin, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should warn the British Minister that he was advised that the defence of Peking and Tientsin required forces far exceeding any that could be supplied from British sources, and that even the defence of Tientsin and the maintenance of the line of communications between that place and the coast involved forces beyond our capacity. That in the circumstances Sir Miles Lampson must be prepared to evacuate both Peking and Tientsin in the case of danger, and that he was at liberty henceforward to issue any warnings or take any steps he deemed necessary, without further reference home. That he should inform his foreign diplomatic colleagues that he had received these latter instructions. And that the Naval Commander-in-Chief, China Station, was being instructed to afford co-operation in any measures of evacuation that he might deem necessary (No. 237) (see Appendix III).*
(f.) That the telegram in (e) should be repeated to the Naval Commander- in-Chief, China Station, who should be instructed by the Admiralty to comply with the last paragraph. It should also be repeated to the General Officer Commanding, North China.
(g.) That the Admiralty should be authorised to empower the Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, to use his aircraft for military or naval purposes, not merely at Shanghai, but to reconnoitre the forts on the Yangtse and anywhere in China within the range of their flight, as he might deem necessary."
12.
The Cabinet at a meeting held on the 7th April, 1927, at 11:30 A.M. (Reference Cabinet 25 (27), Conclusion 2) approved the immediate despatch of an Army Co-operation Squadron to the Shanghai Defence Force.
13. At the request of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and with the authority of the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff assembled on the 8th April, 1927, to consider two telegrams from China regarding the situation at Amoy and Swatow. The Chiefs of Staff examined the question on the assumption that the precise issue upon which they were to report was as to whether they could recommend either the stationing of an Infantry Company at Amoy and Swatow or the evacuation of either or both of these ports by British Nationals.
In their Report (C.I.D. Paper No. 788-B) the Chiefs of Staff concluded:-
"On the evidence before us we see no special reason for the immediate evacuation of either Amoy or Swatow, and this appears to be the view of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, who, as mentioned above, has suggested no further action at Amoy unless the sloop he has sent there reports the situation as critical. We recommend, therefore, that the arrangements, whether for their defence or evacuation in case of necessity, should be left to the Naval Commander-in-Chief, in consultation with the local Consular authority."
14. At the same Meeting (8th April) the Chiefs of Staff had under consideration a letter from the Chief of the Naval Staff drawing attention to the divergence of views in regard to the feasibility of defending Shameen, (a) as expressed by the local authorities at Hong Kong, on which the previous reports of the Sub-Committee (C.I.D. Papers Nos. 759-B and 762-B) had been based, and (b) as contained in the Despatch from the Acting Consul-General at Canton, dated the 17th January, 1927 (C.Ï.D. Paper No. 786–B).
As a result of their discussion at this Meeting, a telegram was sent to the Governor of Hong Kong asking whether the opinions contained in the Acting Consul-General's Despatch (C.I.D. Paper No. 786-B) led him and the local Naval and Military Authorities to modify the views previously expressed by them.
15. On the 11th April the Chiefs of Staff again met to consider the reply from the Governor of Hong Kong to the telegram mentioned in the preceding paragraph. In his reply the Governor of Hong Kong intimated that neither he, the General Officer Commanding nor the Senior Naval Officer had altered their
*
Reproduced as Annexure No. 2 to this Paper.
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